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This paper tests alternative views of the burden that
fiscal policy in the Reagan years placed on future genera-
tions. In the more conventional view, fiscal deficits sub-
stantially crowded out domestic capital formation and
increasednet indebtedness toforeigners, therebyplacing a
significantburden onfuture generations. In an alternative
view, this burden was reduced, or possibly even elimi-
nated, by higherpersonal saving, an improved investment
climatefor business, and a "safe-haven" effect that stimu-
lated capital inflows andincreased the value ofthe dollar.
However, no significant support could befoundfor any of
the various aspects ofthis alternative view. The total eco-
nomic burden thatfiscal policy in the Reagan years placed
onfuture generations is estimatedas equivalentto either a
lump sum payment equal to 9 percent of the nation's
current GNP or an annualpayment equal to 0.4 percent.
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The national debt nearly tripled during the Reagan
Administration. This paper offers a quantitative assess-
ment ofthe economic burden that may havebeen placed on
future generations by fiscal policy in the Reagan years.
One widely held view is that the extra spending that was
financed by the issuance of federal debt during the Reagan
years was generally used for consumption, rather than
investment, and as a result a burden was placed on future
generations. I This burden takes the form of a lower capital
stock, and therefore lower production and incomes in the
future, to the extent that the expenditures that were fi-
nanced by the debt issue "crowded out" private capital
formation. Alternatively, it takes the form of increased
indebtedness to foreigners (without an offsetting increase
in the economy's capital stock) to the extent that
inflows were attracted from abroad. In this case, the
economy's capital stock, and hence production and in-
comes in the future, are not reduced, but the economy's
absorption of future output must decline in order to service
the debt to foreigners.
Both personal and corporate tax rates were cut in the
Reagan years. The cut in corporate rates encouraged
business investment by lowering its after-tax cost of capi-
tal. This would have tended to offset a crowding out of
business investment stemming from the pressure ofbudget
deficits on interest rates. As a result, it is likely that the
greater proportion of the burden from additional debt took
the form of a greaterindebtedness to foreigners, rather than
a lower domestic capital stock. Indeed, U.S. external debt
grew very rapidly during this period.
An alternative view of the reason for rising indebtedness
to foreigners during the Reagan years is that investment
opportunities in the U.S. improved, not only because of the
tax cuts forbusiness but also as a result of deregulation and
a reduced risk of government intervention.? Improved
investmentopportunities in the U.S., inturn, led to greater
net capital inflows. To the extent that these inflows were
matched by increases in the domestic capital stock, they
would not havecreateda burden on future generations. The
stimulus to larger net capital inflows also may have been
reinforced by economic difficulties in many developing
3countries and the election of socialistgovernments abroad,
which could have increased the relative safety of claims on
American capital.
In the alternative view, the budget deficits of the 1980s
had relatively benign effects.3 Households are viewed as
far-sighted enough to foresee the taxes needed to service
the increased federal debt in the future. As a result, they
would tend to increase their saving, offsetting the in-
creased dissaving of government. With relatively little
reduction in national saving, there would be no significant
declineindomestic capitalformation, and hence no signifi-
cant burden on future generations. Finally, to the extent
that lower marginal tax rates stimulated greater work
effort, potential GNP would rise. This would provide a
greater volume of national saving, tending to work against
the adverse effects of budget deficits and minimize the
burden they created for future generations.
This alternative view requires that major shifts occurred
in business investment, the exchange rate, consumption,
and potential output. Therefore Section I of this paper
examines the stability of these variables in relation to their
determinants in a mainline nee-Keynesian macroecono-
metric model of the U.S. economy" It finds that these
macroeconomic variables were not subject to statistically
significant instabilities in the 1980s, and that prediction
errors generally were not consistent with the patterns
called for by the alternative view.
Section II goes on to make a quantitative assessment of
the overall magnitude of the economic burden created for
future generations by federal fiscal policy in the Reagan
years. This is done by using the above macroeconometric
model to simulate the effects of fiscal changes. This
simulationprovides a measure impactof
Reagan fiscal policy on formation in the U.S.
compared to what it would have been with an unchanged
fiscal policy. It also gives an estimate of the contribution of
fiscal policy to the increase in net inflows of foreign capital
to the U.S.
The burden of fiscal created the Reagan
years can be expressed either in terms of (1) the lump sum
amount that would be required to restore the capital stock
and payoffthe extra foreign debt, or (2) the annual loss of
future income due to the reduced capital stock and the
servicing of an increased amount of foreign debt. This is
done in Section III, which also contains a summary and
some policy conclusions.
I. of the Alternative
In the more conventional view, an expansive fiscal
policy was the primary source of higher interest rates, a
strongerdollar, greaternet capital inflows, and largertrade
deficits in the Reagan years. The alternative view stresses
possible offsets to these fiscal effects through an increase
in saving and work effort. In addition, it points to the
possible importance of an improved investment climate in
the U.S., stemming not only from lower taxes on business
but also deregulation, a reduced risk of government inter-
vention, and a safer haven for foreign investment in the
U.S. This stronger investment climate could have been an
independent source of the higher interest rates, stronger
dollar, greater capital inflows, and larger trade deficits.
The sections below examine the relevant in a
structural macroeconometric model for evidence of these
two types of effects.
Consumption and Saving
We begin with the behaviorof consumption and saving.
The consumption function in the macroeconometric model
that is used to simulate the effects of Reagan fiscal policy
follows in modified form the life-cycle theory of Modig-
liani and his colleagues." In this approach, households are
viewed as making a conscious attempt at achieving a
4
preferred distribution of consumption over their lifetimes,
subject to the size of the economic resources expected to
accrue to them. Thus, total consumption of households is a
function of expected labor and property incomes plus the
current value oftheir wealth.
The formation of expectations of future income is cru-
cial to the issue of fiscal effects. In the more conventional
view, there is too much uncertainty about the future for
household expectations to be very forward-looking. In-
stead, the best estimate that households can make of their
future income tends to be based on actual current and past
incomes. This adaptive approach to expectations forma-
tion is empirically implemented by making consumption a
function of a distributed on actual current and
incomes. Thus, in the macroeconometric model consump-
tion is, in part, a function of current and past disposable
income and the currentvalue of stock marketand non-stock
market wealth.
In a pure life-cycle model, a decline in the real market
rate of interest increases the amount that is
consumed if substitution effects outweigh income effects.
The modification to the life-cycle model is that an impor-
tant portion of households are liquidity constrained in the
sense that they cannot borrow all that they might like to
Economic Review / Winter 1991againstfuture income.6 The aggregate size of this liquidity
constrainttends to be related to the unemployment rate and
the levelof nominalinterestrates. Therefore, in addition to
the variables mentioned above, the consumption function
in the macroeconometric model includes a weighted aver-
age of the real and nominal short-term interest rates, as
well as the unemployment rate.
The econometric model's consumption function, with
estimated t statistics in parentheses, is:
7
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i=O
(-6.41) (6.04)
+ .0146 SW - .00217 U' AGYD82
(2.88) (2.22)
Expected inflation enters with a weight of 0.5, implying
equal weights for real and nominal interest rates. The
positive weight for nominal interest rates and the effect of
the unemployment rate indicates the presence of liquidity
constraints. In addition, current consumption is estimated
to respond strongly and positively to disposable income
over the past two years, and also to non-stock market and
stock-market wealth.
A criticism of this type of consumption function is that
households maybe more forward-looking in forming their
expectations of income than assumed in the adaptive
expectations approach. Formal modeling of fiscal effects
under the assumption of forward-looking consumption
behavior has been done in a life-cycle context with over-
lapping generations by Auerbach and Kotlikoff(1987) and
Frenkel and Razin (1987), and on the assumption of an
infinite planning horizon for households with altruistic
bequest motives by Barro (1974).
Over an infinite horizon, the government eventually
must payoff its debt-either explicitly with taxes or
implicitly by inflating it away. As a result, a public with
rational expectations and an infinite horizon could expect
deficit financing now to be matched by explicit or implicit
taxes of equal present value in the future. Therefore, the
consumption spending of (altruistic) households maximiz-
ing utility over an infinite horizon would be the same
whether current government expenditures are financed by
debt or taxation. If a shift to deficit financing does not
change household consumption, then household saving
would increase by enough to finance the increase in
the budget deficit; and there would be no potential for
a crowding out of domestic investment. This idea has
come to be known as the Ricardian equivalence of debt
and taxes."
In the less extreme case of planning only over a life-
cycle, the saving response of households to fiscal deficits
would not be large enough to fully prevent a reduction in
capital formation, or increased indebtedness to foreigners,
because some of the expected taxes would fall on future
generations. However, Poterba and Summers (1986) have
shown that, under a variety of plausible fiscal scenarios a
substantial fraction of the deferred tax burden from deficit
financing is likely to fall on present generations. So even
with no altruistic bequest motive, a rational view of the
government's intertemporal budget constraint could lead
households to increase their saving by a substantial frac-
tion of the increase in government's budget deficit.
Such a response could be considerably weakened, how-
ever, by liquidity constraints and by uncertainty about
taxes facing individuals. Evidence of liquidity constraints
that would make households relatively more responsive to
current income was discussed above. Uncertainty about
when and on whom taxes might be levied also is of
particular importance. Ifbecause of uncertainty taxes are
viewed by households asfollowing arandom walk, then the
current levelof taxes is the best estimate of any future level
of taxes. So a reduction in current taxes would be inter-
preted by consumers as indicating a reduction in the
permanent levelof taxes. They would raise their consump-
tion spending accordingly, so that current taxation would
have a strong and immediate (Keynesian) effect on current
consumption.8
Direct tests of Ricardian versus Keynesian views of
household saving behavior using a wide range of historical
data havenot beenfully conclusive. 9 A major difficulty has
been that until the 1980sthere was relatively little variation
in government deficits independent of wars, cyclical fluc-
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 5or in terms of the civilian unemployment rate
In rate of change form this becomes
sb + i + N.
q . h . (1- U) . l . N.
GNP82 ~ q+ h
GNP82
Potential Output
The macroeconometric model that is later used for
simulating the effects of fiscal the Reagan
years assumes a constant rate of of rull-emnlov-
ment, or potential, output. However, in the alternative view
oflittle or no burdenfrom the debt, reductions in margmai
tax rates wouldhave had a large impacton labor and
thus potential output, as would increases in the rate of
investment. These forces would have tended offset the
adverse effects ofbudget deficits on capital and
indebtedness to foreigners. Therefore, we examine the
need for the of potential
effects.
In the macroeconometric model the rate of
potential output follows an Okun's law As an
identity, output(GNP82) equals outputperperson hours of
labor services (q) times person hours of labor services.
The latter, in turn, can be expressed as the of hours
per worker (h), the employment rate (e), the labor force
participation rate (l), and the civilian adult population
(N). Thus,
GNP82 q . h . e . l . N
tiU = .217 +
(2.59)
3
where:E a ~i = - .114
1=0 ( 12.8)
The estimated growth rate of potential is obtained
by setting the change in the unemployment rate to zero and
Okun (1962) exploited systematic between
these variables to estimate a reduced-form reianonstup
between changes in real GNP and in the unem-
ployment rate. The macroeconometric model this
approach, with the modification of for
the exogenous effect of population since
quarterly data are used, changes in the rate
depend upon a distributed lag on the rate of of
real GNP.
Using annualized growth rates of real GNP and nomna-
tion, the estimatedequation for the
civilian unemployment rate is:
systematic impact on national saving independent of the
effect of budget deficit. However, U.S. experience of a
sustained high level of deficits in the 1980s provides the
opportunity for a cleaner test. .
We do this by examiningthe stabilityofthe econometric
model's consumption function with adaptive expecta-
tions. First, the Quandt (1958, 1960) maximum likelihood
method is used to assess the most likely point (or points,
ifabout equally likely) in the estimation sample at which a
shift in the consumption function's coefficients may have
OOCUlTeIJ; and an F test then is used to assess the statistical
significanceofthe possible shift. 10 Second, the pattern and
direction of out-of-sample forecasting errors for the 1981to
1988 period are examined. I1 This is the period over which
the effects of Reagan fiscal policy are later simulated.
The maximum likelihood ratio indicates most likely
break points in the consumption function at 1970:4 and
1981:1. But stability of the consumption function is ac-
cepted by the F test at a 5 percent level in both cases, as
shown in Table 1.12 The out-of-sample prediction errors for
the period 1981 to 1988 are shown in Chart lA. Up until
1984, there is some tendency towards negative errors,
meaning that actual consumption was less than predicted.
This would be consistent with a Ricardian type of re-
sponse. But the size of these errors averages only around
one-sixth of the large $45 billion tax reductions, in 1982
dollars, that occurred in both 1982 and 1983. Furthermore,
rather than becoming more negative over time as the
budget deficit grew, and as the Ricardian response would
require, the prediction errors became less negative and
eventually as positive as they were negative before. This
pattern oferrors appears to be related more to movements
in consumer confidence over the business cycle than to a
Ricardian response to changes in the budget deficit.
In summary, the errors in the consumption function
during the Reagan years were not atypically large, and they
appearto be more closelyrelated to the business cyclethan
to a Ricardian response to budget deficits. These results
are consistent with those of Summers and Carroll (1987),
who tested Ricardian over the same by
exammmg the out-of-sample predictive powerofa number
ofdifferent models of national saving. IfRicardian equiv-
alence holds and national saving has not been sharply
reduced by budget deficits, it should be possible to find
equations that do not consistently overpredict national
saving. ButSummersandCarroll couldnot find any, andin
most cases the size ofthe errors was close to the size ofthe
budget deficit, suggesting the lack of even a partial Ricar-
dian response.
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 7solving for the corresponding growth rate of real GNP.
With population growth averaging slightly more than 1.0
percent, the equation requires an annual growth rate of 2.7
percent to hold the unemployment rate constant. There-
fore, in the macroeconometric model the growth of poten-
tial output is constant at this rate, except for the small
variations due to population growth.
This equation has been quite stable. As shown in Table
1, the most likely breaks in structure occur at 1974:2 and
1984:1. But F tests reveal no significant shifts in the
equation's coefficients at these points. In addition, the
pattern of out-of-sample forecast errors over the 1981-88
period is not in the direction of unexpectedly high growth
in potential GNP. As shown in Chart IB, the actual change
in unemployment tends to be lower than predicted. But the
estimated growth rate in potential output equals the con-
stant term (plus the contribution from population growth)
divided by the sum ofthe coefficients on real GNPgrowth.
So if these errors were due to downward shift in the
constant term, potential growth would be reduced. Alter-
natively, if they were caused by more highly negative
coefficients on real GNP growth, potential growth also
would be less.
Thus, there is no evidenceof any significant speed-up in
the growth of potential output during the Reagan years.
Still, there may have been a small effect from the fiscal
8
changes that are known to have occurred. These include
possible effects of lower personal tax rates on labor supply,
of greater investment spending on labor productivity, and
of a more efficient allocation of capital on productivity.
Estimates of these specific effects are used to modify the
estimate of the burden of Reagan debt obtained from the
simulation of the macroeconometric model.
Hausman and Poterba (1987) have done a detailed study
of the effects of the 1981-83and 1986 tax changes on labor
supply. They estimate that the 1981 Economic Recovery
and Tax Act raised the labor supply ofprimary earners by
0.4 percent and that of secondary workers by 1.2 percent,
giving a weighted increase of 0.6 in total labor
supply. The 1986 Tax Reform Act is estimated to
increased primary earners' labor supply by 0.9percent and
secondary earners' supply 2.6 resulting in a
total weighted increase of 1.4 percent. Thus, Hausman and
Poterba estimate a total increase of 2 percent in labor
supply due to tax reductions in the Reagan years. An
alternative estimate can be derived from the work of
Fullerton (1982). Fullerton calculates an overall weighted
average elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real
wage of 0.15 percent. As shown in Table 2, from 1980 to
1988 the average marginal tax rate for households fell from
30 percentto 23 percent, meaning that the average after-tax
wage rose from 70 percent to 77 percent of the pre-tax
wage, or by 10 percent. Thus, with an elasticity of 0.15,
labor supply would rise by 1.5 percent-or close to the
estimate by Hausman and Poterba.P
Economic Review / Winter 1991As a generous estimate of labor supply effects, we
assume in the simulation that labor supply was 2 percent
higher than it otherwise would have been over all eight
years of the Reagan administration, and that this increase
was fully incorporated into actual employment and output.
Assuming an elasticity of substitution of 1.0, potential real
GNP would increase by labor's share in total output (.7)
times the 2 percent increase in labor supply, or by 1.4
percent. The average level of real potential GNP over the
was ,500 billion. So the average
increase in potential real GNP would be $3,500 X .014, or
$49 billion. Net private saving (including household sav-
ing in the form of consumerdurables) averages 7percent of
GNP. So the average addition to either the capital stock or
net investment abroad would be $3.4 billion (49 X .07)
per year. Over 8 years that comes to $27.2 in 1982
dollars. This amount will be added in to the simulated
impact of fiscal policy in the Reagan years.
Other possible effects on potential output come from
capital investment. First, to the extent that capital invest-
ment was increased, the productivity of labor would be
increased and potential output raised. But this effect would
not be captured by the Okun's law equation that assumes a
constant growth rate of potential output. The extent of the
required adjustmentfor this effect is examined after
the results of the model's simulation on investment are
obtained. However, the overall size of this adjustment is
very much less than that for the effects on labor supply.
Lower taxes on business tended to raise business invest-
ment, but the higher interest rates due to larger budget
deficits tended to lower it, resulting in relatively little net
effect on investment from fiscal policy.
A second effect could havecome through a change in the
efficiency of the allocation of Capital is ineffi-
ciently allocated if the after-tax cost of capital differs
between different types of capital investments as theresult
of differing tax treatment. Hendershott (l987a) has done
the most detailed study on the effects of tax on the
efficiency of capital's allocation during the Reagan years.
He finds that the 1981-83 tax changes reduced the effi-
ciency of capital's allocation within the corporate sector,
but increased of its between
owner-occupied housing and the sector. Given
the large bias toward owner-occupied housing prior to
these tax changes, overall probably allocated capital
more efficiently. But then, although the 1986 Tax Reform
Act narrowed the differences in the after-taxcost of
across corporate assets, it greatly increased the bias in
favorofowner-occupiedhousing. On balance, Hendershott
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
estimates that the 1986 law returned the overall efficiency
of the allocation of capitalto about that ofthe pre-1981law.
Also, since the size of the efficiency loss under the current
law is estimated at only 0.25 percent of GNP, any possible
changes in it would be of a very small order of magni-
tude. 14 Consequently, no adjustment is made to the results
of the simulation for any effect of fiscal changes on the
efficiency of the allocation of capital.
Business Investment
In the alternative view of the economy, in the Reagan
years investment opportunities improved not only because
of tax cuts for business but also as a result of deregulation
and a reduced risk of government intervention. An im-
proved investmentclimate could havebeen an independent
source of greater capital investment, higher interest rates,
a stronger dollar, and larger capital inflows. Except for the
tax effects, an improved climate for investment would not
necessarily have been a part of the response to Reagan
fiscal policy. Nonetheless, this investment would have
increased the capital stock of future generations, and,
therefore, provided an offset to any burden created for
future generations by fiscal policy in the Reagan years.
Therefore, weexamine the stability of business investment
in relation to its economic determinants.
The macroeconometric model used for the simulation
employs a standard neoclassical model of business fixed
investment, as refined by Hall and Jorgenson.P A firm's
desired capital stock is determined by the expected scale of
its output and relative factor prices. Given its expected
output, the desired capital stock varies inversely with the
real after-tax cost of capital. Because of an imperfect
secondary market forbusiness capital goods, market prices
do not equate desired and actual capital stocks in the short
run. Instead, firms are assumed to eliminate some fraction
of the gap between desired and actual capital stocks in
the currentperiod. This makes planned investment a func-
tion of sales, the rental cost of capital, and the lagged
capital stock.
Because the investment decision gives rise to a whole
stream of investment expenditures, investment spending
appears as a distributed lag on these variables, where the
lags are those between appropriations and expenditures. In
addition, expenditures may be modified after appropria-
tions have been made. This effect is captured by adding a
"surprise" variable, equal to the difference between sales
lagged one quarter and a measure of expected sales.
The model's estimated equation for nonresidential fixed
investment in equipment is:
99
- .00529 _k u_ 1 KPD82 i
l=2
(-0.11)
The equation for nonresidential investment in structures is
similar, except that a relatively short distributed lag on the
real price of oil (POlL), scaled by the size of the capital
stock in structures (KPS82), is included to account for
investment in oil drilling:
9
GIPD82 = -136.6 + .178k u_iGNS82_ i l=2
(-4.11) (5.87)
9
- .0211 k U i RE __ i GNS82_i i=2
(3.32)
9
where k U _ i = 1.0 and i=2
point increase in the real after-tax cost of capital is esti-
mated to depress investment in equipment by 2.1 percent
and investment in structures by 2.6 percent. The expecta-
tions of inflation in the real cost of capital are formed
adaptively.
These investment equations exhibit a high degree of
stability. The most likely break-points occur in 1964:3 for
equipment and in 1976:1 and 1984:1 for structures. But
stability is accepted with an F test at the 5 percent level in
all cases (Table 1). Moreover, out-of-sample prediction
errors for the period 1981-88do not show any patterns that
suggest a distinctly improved investment climate in the
Reagan years (Charts lC and ID). Investmentin equipment
tends to be less than predicted in 1982 recession, but
greaterthan predictedin 1983, and again in 1987and 1988,
when capacity utilization was relatively high. Thus, the
errors appear more closely related to business cycle effects
than to a permanent improvement in the investment cli-
mate. Also, while prediction errors for equipment are
generally positive, those for structures tend to be negative.
Thus, the view that the investment climate improved
independently of taxfactors that are already includedinthe
model of business investment is not supported by the data.
Another recent study that examines the stability of a
standard neoclassical model of business fixed investment
in the 1980s is Corker, Evans, and Kenward (1989). It too
finds that such a conventional model can explain invest-
ment behavior quite well over this period and that evidence
of parameter instability is very limited.
E(GNS82)]
nonresidential fixed investment in
equipment in 1982 dollars
final sales in 1982 dollars
rental cost of capital for equipment
capital stock of equipment, in 1982
dollars
expected final sales
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(5.17) (3.70)
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(-1.63)
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- .106 k U ; KPS82 ;=2
(-2.90)
+ .0395 [GNS82 1 - E(GNS82)]
(3.14)
+ .016 POlL KPS82
(4.25)
+ .016 POlL_I KPS82 1 + .879 e I'
(2.92) (17.9)
The real after-tax cost of capital has an important
influence on both types of investment. A one percentage
The Exchange Rate
In the alternative view of the economy in the Reagan
years, the emergence of a relatively safe haven for foreign
investment was an important factor in increasing the net
inflow of capital to the U.S. and driving up the value of the
dollar, tending to offset any crowding out of domestic
capital formation that would have been generated by bud-
get deficits. Again, although a safe haven effect would not
necessarily have been a response to Reagan fiscal policy, it
could have provided an offset to the burden of fiscal policy
created in the Reagan years by increasing the capital stock
for future generations.
A safe haven effect would have produced instability in
the macroeconometric model's equation for the exchange
rate. This equation follows the asset theory of exchange
rates in which an open interest parity condition approxi-
mately holds. 16 Except for a risk premium, the currentreal
value of the exchange rate is assumed to be at the point
where the expectedcapitalgains or losses from itsexpected
future return to long-run equilibrium just offset the dif-
10 Economic Review ! Winter 1991- .0908
(-6.80)
ference between interest returns in the U.S. and abroad.
This implies that the current real value of the dollar equals
its expected future equilibrium value plus the difference in
real interest returns between U.S. and foreign assets, plus
the amountofany risk premium. A safe haven effect for the
dollar would make this risk premium more positive.
Real long-term interestrates in the model are assumedto
conform to the expectations theory of the term structure of
interestrates, whereexpectationsoffutureshort-termrates
and future inflation are formed adaptively.'? Expectations
may be formed differently for interest rates than for infla-
tion. So the real value of the dollar becomes a function of
separate distributed lags on the differences between U.S.
and foreign interest rates, and between U.S. and foreign
inflation. Also, the market's expectationof the equilibrium
real value of the dollar depends upon expected high-
employment budget balances at home and abroad. Al-
though the sign of these latter effects is theoretically
indeterminate, depending importantly on the market's ef-
fective time horizon, it is found that expectations ofa larger
budget surplus depress the expected real value of a coun-
try's currency because of the expected reduction in the
government's demand for credit. Expectations of future
budget positions are assumed to be formed adaptively,
being based on the high-employment budgetary balance
over the previous year.[8
The econometric model's exchange rate equation is:
17
InEXCH = 3.38 + 2. a i (is iiLi i=O
(62.5)
17 ..
+ 2. b_(p-p*) .
i=O 1 I
- .0374B + .0477B* + .708e
(-2.46) (1.68) (7.79)
17 17
2. a . = .0908 2. b- i
i=O -1 (6.90) 1=0
where EXCH real trade-weighted value of U.S.
dollar
is' i'; short-term interest rate in the U.S.
and abroad, respectively.
p, p" inflation rate in the U.S. and abroad,
respectively.
B, B* = high employment budget balance as
percent of high employment GNP in
previous four quarters for U.S. and
foreign countries, respectively.
A sustained one percentage point increase in the differ-
ential between U.S. real short-term interest rates and the
trade-weighted foreign real rate is estimated to raise the
real trade-weighted value of the dollar by 9 percent. Also,
a one percentagepoint increase in the U.S. budgetsurplus,
as a percentof high employmentGNP, lowers the real value
ofthe dollar by approximately 4 percent through its effect
on the expectedequilibrium value ofthe dollar, while a like
change in the trade-weighted foreign budget balance ap-
preciates the dollar by about 5 percent.
Turning to the stability of the exchange rate equation,
the most likely break point in its structure is found to be
1982:2. But an F test reveals no significant shift in its
coefficients at this point, as shown in Table 1. Also, the
out-of-sample predictionerrors for the period 1981to 1988,
shown in Chart IE, indicate only a temporary safe-haven
effect at best. Up until 1985 the dollar's value is somewhat
stronger than predicted. But the size of this error averages
no more than 4 percent, and nearly equally large errors in
the opposite direction subsequently develop. Thus, even if
there was a small safe-haven effect acting to strengthen the
dollar by increasing the risk premium up until 1985, a
nearly equally large negative effect on the risk premium
occurred after 1985. Therefore there is no evidence of a
sustained safe-haven effect during the 1980s, which would
have raised U.S. domestic investment significantly by
attracting net capital inflows independently of the effect of
U.S. fiscal policy'?
H. Simulated Effects of Fiscal Policy
The previous section found no significant shifts in key
macroeconomic relationships that might either bias the
simulated effects of fiscal policy in the 1980s or create
an independent offset to the estimated burden of fiscal
policy on future generations. This section goes on to
simulate the effects of fiscal policy on U.S. capital forma-
tion and indebtedness to foreigners, using the mainline
nee-Keynesian macroeconometric model.
Most of the key relationships in this model have been
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
described in the previous section. Itis assumed that short-
term interest rates are determined either as matter of
Federal Reserve policy or, if money is being targeted,
through an equilibriumbetweenthe supplyand demandfor
money. Long-term interestrates basicallyfollow the expec-
tations theory of the term-structure of interest rates. For-
eign central banks are assumed to partially respond to
changes in U.S. interest rates so as to stabilize their
economies.
11Investment spending on consumerdurables and housing
is importantly determined by nominal after-tax interest
rates because of the importance of liquidity constraints,
while investment spending on business plant and equip-
ment responds to real after-tax interest rates. Net exports
are dependent upon the real exchange rate, which in tum is
a function of differences between real interest rates at
home and abroad, as well as expected budget deficits.
These elements of spending then combine with con-
sumption spending and inventory investmentto determine
the aggregate demand for output and the rate of unemploy-
ment. The inflation rate is determined by an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve, in which the inflation is a
function of the current unemployment rate and expected
inflation, with additional effects from the price of oil and
the exchange rate. Expectations in the Phillips curve are
formed adaptively, and there is no trade-offbetween infla-
tion and unemployment in the long run. 20
Simulation Methodology
The effects offiscal policy during the Reagan years were
estimated in two steps. First, the historical errors in each
equation of the macroeconometric model were added back
in to allow a simulation of the model to replicate history
exactly, or in other words to producethe historical baseline.
Second, with historical errors still in the equations, the
effect on the economy of holding the relevant fiscal policy
variables at their 1980 levels, instead of at their actual
historical values, was simulated. Then the difference be-
tweenthe economy's performance in the historical baseline
and in the counterfactual simulation with an unchanged
fiscal policy after 1980 can be attributed to the changes in
fiscal policy that occurred during the Reagan years.
Two aspects of this approach require further elabora-
tion. The first is the measurement of an unchanged fiscal
policy, andthe second is the assumptionmade withrespect
to monetary policy. From a macroeconomic point of view,
there are two dimensions to the measurement of an un-
changed fiscal policy. First, there should be no change
in federal marginal tax rates that would alter economic
incentives. For example, in the macroeconometric model
the average marginal tax rate for households affects their
after-tax mortgage rate and, therefore, influences expendi-
tures on housing. Similarly, business taxes influence the
cost of capital for nonresidential investment and rental
housing. An unchanged fiscal policy is defined, in part, as
one that does not alter marginal tax rates that affect these
expenditures.
As shown in Table 2, the Economic Recovery and Tax
Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the
average marginal federal tax rate on individual income
12
from 30 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 1988. In the coun-
terfactual simulation that keeps fiscal policy unchanged,
the average federal marginal tax rate for households is
therefore held constant at 30 percent from 1980 through
1988, instead of being allowed to fall. As a result, after-tax
interestratesfor households are reduced, and theirexpend-
itures on durable items are raised, relative to actual ex-
penditures in this period.
The Tax Act of 1981 also reduced effective tax rates on
business investment by shortening depreciable "tax lives"
and increasing the investment tax credit for purchases of
equipment. The Tax and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
took back part, but by no means all, of these tax cuts for
business as a part of a package to reduce the size of the
federal budget deficit. Then, in 1986, the Tax Reform Act
reduced the corporate income tax rate from 46 percent to
34 percent, butat the same time eliminated the investment
tax credit for equipment and lengthened the tax lives for
residential and nonresidential structures. The net effects of
thesechanges are also shownin Table 2. 21The effective tax
rate on investment in equipment dropped from 13 percent
in 1980 to only 1percentin 1985, but then rose to 14percent
by 1988. The tax rates on investment in structures and
rental housing were cut by one third to one half in this
period. In the counterfactual simulation of an unchanged
Economic Review I Winter 1991fiscal policy, these effective tax rates are held at their 1980
values, tending to reduce business investment spending
relative to actual business investment in the 1980s.
The second dimension of an unchanged fiscal policy
is that there should be no change in federal outlays
and receipts measured on a high employment basis. Un-
changed receipts would prevent disposable income, and
hence consumption, from changing on account of fiscal
policy. With unchanged government receipts and outlays,
as well as unchanged marginal tax rates, there would
be no change in aggregate demand due to a change in
fiscal policy.
As shown in Table 3, the federal high employment
budget deficit rose from 0.3 percent of high employment
GNP in 1980to 4.0percent in 1986, and then dropped back
to 2.4 percent of GNP by 1988. (In this calculation of the
fixeddeficit, the erosion in thereal valueofthe federal debt
due to inflation is counted as areceipt, as explained in Box
1). The most permanentcontributorto the deficit's increase
was an increasing ratio of federal transfer payments to
GNP, which rose over 2 percentage points. In contrast,
purchases of goods and services as a proportion of high
employment GNP rose only a little more than one percent-
age point through 1985, but returned almost to their 1980
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 13level by 1988. Although the ratio of income tax receipts to
GNP dropped two percentage points, a rise in Social
Security taxes approximately offset this decline.
In the counterfactual simulation of an unchanged fiscal
policy, the ratio of federal purchases of goods and services
to high-employment GNP is held at its 1980 value. In the
macroeconometric model, the impact of policy induced
changes in total federal receipts and transfer payments on
household disposable income, and hence consumption, is
captured by the ratio of cyclically adjusted federal taxes
less transfer payments to high employment GNP. So in the
counterfactual simulation of an unchanged fiscal
this ratio is also held at its 1980 value, for an
adjustment for state and local taxes.
As shown inTable 3, the Reagan fiscal package included
a reduction in grants-in-aid to state and local govern-
ments. These governments were able to absorb the
reductions and maintain approximately the same level of
14 Economic Review / Winter 1991services by raising taxes toward the end of the 1981-82 re-
cession (see Weicher (1987)). Since the change inthe ratio
of cyclically adjusted federal taxes less transfer payments
to high-employment GNP overstates the total reduction in
net taxes and transfers, in the counterfactual simulation
this change was adjusted for the increase in state and
local taxes.
Finally, the burden of fiscal policy during the Reagan
years would have been reduced to the extent that the
increase in federal debt financed greater capital formation
by the federal government. But as discussed in Box 2, the
federal government's capital formation as a percent of high
employment GNP was neither significantly higher nor
lower during the Reagan years than it was earlier. There-
fore, in the counterfactual simulation of an unchanged
fiscal policy no change is made in the amount of public
investment.
The counterfactual simulation of an unchanged fiscal
policy requires an assumption to be made with respect to
the reaction of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy. The
goal of theReagan Administration and the Federal Reserve
was to reduce the rate of inflation from near doubledigit to
more moderate levels. Monetary policy was successful in
achieving this objective. Inflation in the GNP price index
dropped from 9.3 percent in 1980 to 4.0 percent in 1984
and stayed in the 4 percent range through the end of the
decade. The demand for money became unstable in this
period, however,and the Federal Reserve shifted emphasis
in its short-run operating procedures from targeting money
to looking through to its ultimate economic objective of
controlling inflation. But because of the long lags between
monetary policy and its impact on inflation, an interme-
diate target was still needed.
One widely used approach for forecasting the dynamics
of inflation is the expectations-augmented Phillips curve
with adaptive expectations, as used in the macroecono-
metric model in this paper. In this framework, the unem-
ployment rate is a logical intermediate target for monetary
policy. Unemployment has both a direct effect on the
inflation rate through current labor market pressures and
an indirect one operating through inflation expectations.
So any desired path for inflation requires a corresponding
path forthe unemployment rate. In the basic counterfactual
simulation of an unchanged fiscal policy, it is therefore
assumed that the Federal Reserve used the unemployment
rate as an intermediate target and achieved the same
unemployment rate as occurred historically.22
As is common, the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve in this macroeconometric model also contains an
effect on inflation from current and lagged changes in the
real value of the dollar. This effect operates through
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competitive pressures in the tradeable goods sector of the
economy. These effects are assumed to be regarded as one-
time changes by market participants and therefore do not
feed through to inflation expectations. But an unchanged
fiscal policy would have produced a lower value for the
dollar than actually occurred, and consequently a higher
price level. Therefore, to achieve any price level, the
Federal Reserve would have had to conduct a tighter
monetary policy than otherwise. Foranalternative reaction
of monetary policy, we therefore assume in the counter-
factual simulation that the Federal Reserve achieved the
same level of prices by the end of the Reagan years as
actually occurred. This would imply higher interest rates
and higher unemployment than in the case of the counter-
factual simulation that uses the unemployment rate as
a target.
The simulated effects of fiscal policy during the Reagan
years are mosteasily seen in chartform. These charts show
the results of the simulation on the assumption that the
Federal Reserve would have targeted the unemployment
rate. The results of the simulation under the alternative
target for monetary policy are discussed below. Although
nominal yields on long-term bonds generally declined in
the 1980s, real (or inflation adjusted) bond rates actually
rose quite substantially. Furthermore, as shown in Chart
2A, the rise in real bond rates was primarily due to the
effect of fiscal policy. It is estimated that with an un-
changed fiscal policy the real bond rate still would have
shown considerable cyclical fluctuation, but would have
been 1to 2 percentage points lower on average.
Nextconsiderthe investment sectors ofthe economythat
would havebeen significantly affected by the higher inter-
est rates, starting with residential investment. As men-
tioned earlier, in the case of owner occupied housing, the
lower marginal income tax rates of the Reagan fiscal
program worked to discourage housing investment by
raising the after-tax cost of capital. But in rental housing
the effective tax rate on new investment went down. Of
course, both sectors were discouraged by higher interest
rates. Chart 2B shows that the net effect of fiscal
was to reduce total residential investment. Residential
investment wasclearly crowded outby the fiscalexpansion
in this period, consistent with the conventional view.
Chart 2C shows a similar story for household spending
on consumerdurables. Both the tax effects and the interest
rate effects of fiscal policy in the Reagan years worked
to discourage consumer spending on durables, and the
simulation confirms that with an unchanged fiscal policy
consumer spending on durables generally would have
been higher.
There was a significant increase in tax incentives for
15Chart 2
Simulated Effects of Fiscal Policy
During Reagan Years
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16 Economic Review / Winter 1991business investment, however. Indeed, Chart 2D shows
that they were strong enough to outweigh the effects of
higher real interest rates to some extent. Thus, the fiscal
expansion in the Reagan years on balance acted to raise
business investment by a modest amount, or to crowd it in
rather than to crowd it out. But taking these three invest-
ment sectors together over the entire 1981 to 1988period,
the reduction in the stock of housing and consumer dura-
bles exceeded the stimulus to nonresidential fixed capital
by $40.3 billion, as shown in Table 4. In addition, the
simulation shows a $13.6 billion reduction in the stock of
inventories, bringing the total simulated reduction in the
capital stock to $53.9 billion.
Other studies have been unable to find any significant
change in the rate of accumulation of fixed nonresidential
capital in the 1980s. Forexample, Oliner (1989)concludes
that the pace of accumulation of business capital in the
1980s continued to support a rate of capital deepening
(relative to the labor force) not much different from the
postwar average, suggesting that characterizations of capi-
tal formation in the 1980s as unusually weak or unusually
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
strong are unwarranted. Another study by Englander and
Steindel (1989) also reaches the same conclusion.
Our simulated increase in fixed nonresidential capital
due to fiscal changes in the 1981 to 1988 period comes to
$47.2 billion in 1982dollars, or 1.3 percent ofthe average
level of that stock in the 1980s; and under the alternative
assumption for monetary policy it is $65.6 billion, or 1.8
percent. This is equivalent to an increase in the annual
growth rate of the stock of fixed nonresidential capital of
around 0.2percent during this period. Given the small size
of this number relative to the long-term growth trend of
about 3 percent, it is not surprising that other studies have
not been able to find a significant break in the rate of
accumulation of business capital in the 1980s.
Neither are the estimated effects on the capital stock
large enough to significantly alter GNP. Assume
that all of the estimated $27.2 billion effect of a larger
labor supply on private savingwaschanneled into domestic
capital formation. Still, the total change in domestic capi-
tal stock (exclusive of consumer durables) comes to a
decline of$24.2billion inthe simulation where theFederal
Reserve targets the unemployment rate, and to an increase
of $9A in the alternative simulation. As a result, the
average levelof thecapital stockas apercent ofGNP would
have been 0.3 percent lower to 0.1 percent higher than
otherwise. Assuming a 20 percent gross rate of return on
investment, potential GNP therefore would have been .06
(.3 x .2) percent lower to .02 (.1 x .2) percent higher
because of the effects of fiscal policy on capital formation.
Since these estimates are small (equaling less than one-
twentieth of the estimated effect of labor supply on poten-
tial output) and on average close to zero, no adjustment is
made for the effect of investment on potential output.
The remaining burden offiscal policy during the Reagan
years stems from its effect on indebtedness to foreigners.
As we have seen, fiscal policy put upward pressure on real
interest rates in the United States. These, in tum, attracted
capital from abroad which was used either directly or indi-
rectly to financethe higher levelofgovernment borrowing.
As foreign investors purchased put upward
pressure on the real foreign exchange value of the dollar.
Chart 2E shows the effect of fiscal policy on the real
trade-weighted value of the dollar. The large volume of
foreign capital that the Reagan fiscal expansion attracted
put significant upward pressure on the dollar. It boosted
the real value of the dollar by a maximum of nearly 25 per-
cent in 1985; and even by 1988, when the federal budget
deficit had been reduced somewhat, the real value of the
17dollar was still 15percent higher than it otherwise would
have been.
A by product ofthe strongerdollarwasalargedeteriora-
tion inour trade balance. Forsupplytoequal demand inthe
foreign exchange market, a dollar of extra capital inflow
must produce a dollar's worth of reduction in net exports.
So the reduction in net exports is also a measure of the net
increase in foreign capital inflows.23 As shown in Chart
2F,U.S. net exports wouldhavedeclined-andnet capital
inflows increased-even with an unchanged fiscal policy
because of the strong growth of the U.S. economy as it
pulled out ofthe 1982recession. But by 1988the changein
fiscal policy had reduced the value of net exports in 1982
dollars by over$90 billion. Thus, theeffectoffiscalpolicy
in the Reagan years was to add about $90 billion dollars
indebtedness to foreigners in peak years, and lesser
amounts in other years, without increasing the domestic
capital stock to provide any more income to service this
debt. As showninTable4, by 1988foreignindebtedness is
estimated to have been $370.7 billion greater, in 1982
dollars, than it otherwise would have been with an un-
changed fiscal policy.
The assumption that the Federal Reserve would have
targeted theprice level, rather thanthe unemploymentrate,
makesrelativelylittle difference tothe simulatedeffectsof
fiscal policy,as shown in Table4. On the assumption that
monetary policy targeted the unemployment rate, fiscal
policy in the Reagan years reduced the price level by 2
percent because of a stronger dollar. So targeting the price
level would have allowed a somewhat easier monetary
policy. However, this reduces the simulated increase in
short-term interest rates that is attributed to the effects of
fiscalchanges in the Reagan years by only 15basis points.
The estimated impact of fiscal policy on the total stock of
capital is reduced by $40.5 billion, and on indebtedness to
foreigners by $8.2 billion. The total estimated burden of
fiscal policy is reduced by only 12percent.
Another intermediate target that the Federal Reserve
might have followed in this period is nominal GNP. But
targeting the unemployment rate is almost the same as
targeting real GNP, given the small supply-sideeffects of
fiscalpolicy onpotential output. Soa simulation assuming
nominalGNP targeting (or somecombination of real GNP
and price leveltargeting) onthepart of theFederal Reserve
would lie between the other two alternatives.
III. Summary and Conclusions
This paper hastested alternativeviewsoftheburden that provement in the investment climate of the U.S., which
fiscal policy placed on future generations in the Reagan could have independently boosted the stock of capital
years. The moreconventional viewisthatfiscaldeficitsled for future generations. Although business investment re-
to a substantial crowding out of capital formation and net sponded positively to reductions in the effective rate of
exports, and as a result reduced the capital stock and taxation, it did not exhibit any unusual strength relative to
increased the indebtedness of future generations to for- its usual economicdeterminants. Similarly,althoughthere
eigners. In the alternative view, there were important is some evidence of a small "safe-haven" effect acting to
offsetting responses to fiscal policy that reduced these strengthen the dollar and net capital inflowsup until 1985,
effects. One isaRicardian responseofprivatesavingtothe an equal and opposite effect on the dollar developed
budget deficits, and another is a positive response of afterward. Thus, thereisnoevidenceofany sustainedsafe-
private saving, investment, and workefforttolowermargi- haven effect during the 1980s, which would have lowered
nal tax rates. But no evidence of a Ricardian response in the cost of capital and raised U.S. domestic investmentby
consumption is found, and the estimated response of attracting net capital inflows from abroad independently
to changes in the real interest rate is very small. from the pull of U.S. fiscal policy.
Similarly, the estimated effects of lowermarginal taxrates The cumulative change in the U.S. high employment
on labor supply, and hencepotential output, provide onlya budget deficit from 1981 to 1988comes to $619.4 billion,
small offset to the burden. Also, while lower tax rates in 1982dollars (Table 3). The longer-runtendency should
stimulated domestic investment, higher real interest rates be for budget deficits to fully crowd out interest sensitive
discouraged it. As a result, no significant influence of private investment spending and net exports. But because
domestic investment on potential output is estimated. of lags in the responses of investment to interest rates, and
Neither is it possible to find any evidence of an im- net exports to the exchange rate, the actual effect overany
18 EconomicReview / Winter 1991finite period should be smaller. A simulation using a
mainline neo-Keynesian macroeconometric model esti-
mates the reduction in the total domestic stock due
to fiscal changes in the years at $66.8 in
1982 dollars, when the rate is assumedto be
the intermediate target of monetary policy. Alternatively,
the reduction comes to $26.8 billion if it is assumed that
the Federal Reserve targeted the level. the
largest estimated impact by far is on net exports, and
therefore on an increased indebtedness to It is
estimated that fiscal policy in the years increased
net indebtedness to foreigners by $410.3 billion, in 1982
dollars, if the rate is assumed as an inter-
mediate target for monetary and .6 billion if
the price level is assumed as the target.
It is interesting to compare these estimates with those
from other macroeconornetric models. Helliwell (1990)
has surveyed the consequences of an increase in debt-
financed U.S. government spending for ten multicountry
econometric models having alternative kinds of expecta-
tions. In almost all of them, there is complete or nearly
complete crowding out of real spending and net
exports in the medium term; and the crowding out tends to
be divided about evenly between investment expenditures
and net exports.
There are two fundamental reasons why the simulation
in this paper produces a larger proportionate effect on net
exports, and smaller impact on investment, than in the
models surveyed by Helliwell. In the first place, the simula-
tions surveyed by Helliwell assume only a simplechange in
debt-financed government spending, and so do not capture
the full details of the kinds offiscal changes that occurred
in the Reagan years. In the tax cuts for
business tended to shift crowding out from domestic in-
vestment to net exports. Second, a unique feature of the
present macroeconometric model is an expectational effect
ofbudget deficits on the exchange rate. Thus, the expecta-
tion of continued U.S. budget deficits raised the value of
the dollar independently from the budget's effect on inter-
est rates. As a result, the dollar rose by more and interest
rates rose by less than would otherwise have been the case.
This shifted the crowding out even further on to net P'Yf)()rr<;:
and away from domestic investment. 24
The burden that fiscal policy on future genera-
tions in the Reagan years can be either in terms
of 0) the lump sum amount would be to
restore the capital stock and payoffthe extra foreign
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
or (2) the annual loss offuture income due to the reduced
capital stock and the servicing of an increased amount of
foreign debt. Over the full eight years of the Reagan
Administration, the total burden on
generations comes to a sum amount of between
$361.6 and $410.3 billion, in 1982 dollars, on
the assumption made for This includes a
$27.2 billion offset from favorable labor supply
created by lower marginal tax rates. To put this total
burden in it is to about 9 of
nation's current output, or $2,706 in current dollars
every memberofthe adult population. This is what it would
cost to restore lost stock
lVl'-'l1",l1 debt incurred.
Alternatively, the burden would otherwise take the form
ofan annual loss in income due to a lowercapital stock and
the need to service the increased amount of lVl'-'lE,H
At a current 4 percent real bond rate, this comes to an
annual payment equal to 0.4 percent current or
$110 per year in today's dollars for every member of the
adult population, forever.
Ofcourse, current generations benefitted in the Reazan
years by consuming more domestic and foreign goods than
they would have otherwise. But since omecnve mterper-
sonal welfare comparisons between different generations
cannot a scientific assessment of the overall
effect of fiscal policy on the nation's economic is
not possible. Still, the estimated of the burden on
future generations is a good measure of the size of
intergenerational transfer that has occurred. Ifthe burden
were paid offnow, future generations would be relieved of
and the currentgeneration would bearthe full costofits
current consumption. This would be an anpronnate
if we truly do not want to better our own welfare at
expense of future generations.
To correct this intergenerational the Bush
Administration has proposed running budget surpluses
the mid-I990s.25 The broad outlines of were
incorporated into the budget summit agreement of last
year, and a down of about $40 in
reduction has been madefor fiscal 1991. Suchreductions in
the budget along with resulting in
interest rates and the value of the would stimulate
private domestic investment and reduce net rrw'",wm
inflows. As a consequence, the burden on genera-
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The Reagan program initially reduced the tax rate on
business investment by increasing the present value of
depreciation (z) and increasing the investment tax credit
(k). Forthe derivation of this see Hall and Jorgen-
son (1967) or Throop (1989a).
13. Other estimates inthe same neighborhood have been
made by Hausman (1983) and Kendrick (1983)
14. See Hendershott (1987a).
15. The basic theory and its application are described in
Jorgenson (1963), Hall (1971) and Hall and
(1967).
16. The asset view of exchange markets was pioneered
by Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979)
17. See Modigliani and Shiller (1973).
18. Earlier studies of this particular exchange rate equa-
tion are Hutchison and Throop (1985)and Throop (1989d,
198ge).
19. See also Throop (1989b, 1989c), in which it is argued
that movements in US and foreign monetary and fiscal
policies, rather than other factors such as safe-haven
effects, explain most of the fluctuation inthe dollar's value
during the floating rate period.
20. Throop (1988) tests adaptive measures of expected
inflation against more "rational," or forward looking,
measures, but finds that the adaptive expectations have
provided a better representation of actual expectations
of inflation, even when monetary policy was changing
sharply as in the post-October 1979period of disinflation.
See also Kaufman and Woglom (1984)
Two relationships in the model which were not exam-
ined in the previous section but which are potentially
subject to instabilities because of expectational effects
are the term structure of interest rates and the inflation
equation. Although the term structure equation does show
some evidence of instability during atemporary shift inthe
"monetary regime" between 1979 and 1982, there is no
evidence of significant instability due to changes in fiscal
policy. In particular, expected budget deficits are not
found to enter significantly into the term-structure equa-
tion. See Throop (1988,1989a) and Blanchard (1984) The
stability ofthe expectations-augmented Phillips curve that
is used to explain inflation in the model has been con-
firmed in a number of studies. for example, Gordon
(1985), Perry (1983), and Blanchard (1984).
21. The effective tax rate on equity financed business
investment shown in Table 3 is calculated as
, M. Friedman (1989), and Judd
error
tion itself
11. Similar to the for the Ftests, the forecasting
equation was for the period up until 1981 using
the serial correlation coefficient from the full sample pe-
riod 1989.
12. Because the Quandt test was used to identify most
break effective critical values would actually
be somewhat than those reported for the Fdistribu-
tion alone in 1.
oVQrnnlo B. Friedman (1988),Gramlich (1989),
Modioliani for statements of this view. For an
relevant collection of economists'
of the debt, see Ferguson
2. See
3. See Barro (1 1989).
4. This model is described in Throop (1
5. For elaboration of this see Modigliani and
Ando and Modigliani (1963), Modigliani
C:tn;nrlni (1 ). (1
6. detailed C-hf-."iinrt the importance of 1I\.j'JlUlly
constraints is Wilcox
7. David Ricardo was one of the first to discuss
the he did not believe in the equivalence between
debt and but like Adam Smith before him, argued
that taxes on households reduce current con-
while internal borrowing tends to result in
reduced capital formation. Thus, the "Ricardian Equiva-
lence Theorem" should be relabeled the "Non-Ricardian
Enuivalence Theorem" and Ricardo's doctrine relabeled
the "Ricardian Non-Equivalence Theorem." See Buiter
and Tobin and O'Driscoll (1977).However, for ease
of we have followed conventional usage.
8. As Blinder (1 it "When an individual has very
diffuse over what government policy will
it me as that his point estimates of
future may have weak effects on his
current is just the opposite of what
Barro and and Wallace assume. Ifthis is so, then
deep and weighty, may not
ornnirii,--QI importance."
recent survey of the theory and evi-
dence on Rir'Qrrli",n equivalence, see Bernheim (1987).
Earlier surveys include Brunner (1986) and Tobin (1980,
Ch.
1 See Chow (1 For this test all the variables were
transformed to the estimated serial correlation
coefficient for the sample. The F test was then per-
formed on the residuals from the estimated equations
these transformed variables. This procedure avoids
reiection of because of in the
as to a shift in the structural equa-
20 Economic Review / Winter 199122. Because of a problem known asinstrument instability,
this can only be done approximately SeeHolbrook (1972)
for a general discussion. Only a fraction of the total effect
of a change in interest rates on the unemployment rate
occurs contemporaneously Thus, if the targeted unem-
ployment rate is hit exactly in a current period, in subse-
quent periods the lagged effects of the initial change in
interest rates have to be offset This can result in ever-
larger oscillations in interest rates. Therefore, a degree of
smoothing of interest rates is required. Still, the unem-
ployment rate in the counterfactual simulation of an un-
changed fiscal policy does not differ from the historical
unemployment rate by more than 0.1 percentage in
any quarter.
23. The reduction in net exports is only an approximate
measure of the increase in net capital inflows. There are
two types of errorsthat tend to work inopposite directions.
Interest payments on foreign debt are not modeled ex-
plicitly in the macroeconometric model. Therefore, to the
extent that interest payments on debt to foreigners are
financed by further capital inflows, equating the change in
net indebtedness to the simulated change in net exports
understates the increase in indebtedness. On the other
hand, this procedure overstates the increase inindebted-
ness if the assumption in the simulation of a constant risk
premium in the foreign exchange market does not hold
exactly In this case, the accumulation of debt has the
effect of reducing the risk premium, and therefore the
value ofthe dollar. Thiswould generate higher netexports
and smaller net capital inflows than in the simulation.
24. See Throop (1989d, 198ge) for a fuller discussion.
25. See Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal
Year 1991.
26. SeeEisner (1986,1989), Blades and Sturm(1982) and
Throop (1980) for further discussion of this inflation tax.
The structural macroeconometric model that is used to
simulate the effects of Reagan fiscal policy subtracts the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
inflation tax on all government debt from the NIPA meas-
ureof disposable income. Thisinflation-adjusted measure
of income is consistent with households behaving ra-
tionally and generally saving (and reinvesting) inflation
premiums in the interest on government debt
Because of this behavior, the private saving rate as
conventionally measured should tend to rise and fall with
the inflation rate. This response of the private saving rate
to inflation is particularly evident in some European coun-
tries that have experienced sharp changes ininflation, but
itis somewhat obscured in U.S.data by movements inthe
ratio of wealth to income, which influences the saving rate
in a life-cycle model of consumption. SeeThroop (1989a).
27. Because of adjustment costs, households tend to
respond to their perception of the permanent reduction in
real wealth due to the inflation tax. The inflation tax on
federal debt is therefore calculated as an eight-quarter
moving average of the inflation rate in consumer prices
times the stock of federal debt held by U.S. residents.
28. Algebraically, by definition GNP C + I + G +
X M, where C is private consumption, I is domestic
investment, G is government spending, and X M is
exports less imports. But since GNP C S (private
saving) + T(taxes), then S + T - G = I + X - M. Thus,
given private saving (S), a reduction in the government
surplus (T G) always decreases domestic investment
(I) or net foreign investment (equal to X - M).
29. These figures do not include matching grants to state
and local governments for state and local capital spend-
ing. Inanaccounting sensethis capital does not belong to
the federal government, and in a behavioral sense the
prevailing empirical evidence is that grants do not build
up the stock of state and local capital because of a fiscal
substitution effect (see Gramlich (1978)). In any case,
federal grants to finance state and local capital projects
dropped by $7.5 billion in constant dollars between 1980
and 1988.
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